Pull Incentives for Antibacterial Drug Development: An Analysis by the Transatlantic Task Force on Antimicrobial Resistance

Clin Infect Dis. 2017 Oct 15;65(8):1378-1382. doi: 10.1093/cid/cix526.

Abstract

New alternative market models are needed to incentivize companies to invest in developing new antibacterial drugs. In a previous publication, the Transatlantic Task Force on Antimicrobial Resistance (TATFAR) summarized the key areas of consensus for economic incentives for antibacterial drug development. That work determined that there was substantial agreement on the need for a mixture of push and pull incentives and particularly those that served to delink the revenues from the volumes sold. Pull incentives reward successful development by increasing or ensuring future revenue. Several pull incentives have been proposed that could substantially reward the development of new antibacterial drugs. In this second article authored by representatives of TATFAR, we examine the advantages and disadvantages of different pull incentives for antibacterial drug development. It is TATFAR's hope that this analysis, combined with other related analyses, will provide actionable information that will shape policy makers' thinking on this important issue.

Keywords: TATFAR; antibiotic resistance; antimicrobials; economic incentives.

MeSH terms

  • Advisory Committees
  • Anti-Bacterial Agents* / economics
  • Anti-Bacterial Agents* / therapeutic use
  • Drug Discovery* / economics
  • Drug Discovery* / legislation & jurisprudence
  • Drug Discovery* / organization & administration
  • Drug Industry* / economics
  • Drug Industry* / legislation & jurisprudence
  • Drug Industry* / organization & administration
  • Drug Resistance, Bacterial*
  • Humans
  • Motivation

Substances

  • Anti-Bacterial Agents