Research on differential game of platform corporate social responsibility governance strategy considering user and public scrutiny

PLoS One. 2024 Apr 26;19(4):e0301632. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0301632. eCollection 2024.

Abstract

The development of digital technology and the sharing economy has extended corporations' innovative activities beyond the corporation's boundaries, so it has become more urgent to govern the lack of social responsibility and alienation of platform corporations from the perspective of social agents. First, the platform's CSR classification and social responsibility governance's main content are analyzed in this research. Then, this study uses government agencies, platform corporations, users, and the public as governance subjects and compares governance decisions with and without public and user oversight. Finally, the optimal balance strategy for each governing subject, the optimal trajectory of governance volume, and the trajectory of total revenue are obtained. The study found that: 1) Public and user supervision can improve the governance volume while encourage the governance motivation of government agencies and platform corporations. 2) The level of user supervision effort has a greater impact on the total governance revenue than public supervision. 3) The revenue of the system and the governance volume are greater in a centralized decision-making process, indicating that those involved should co-operate in governance based on the principle of mutual benefit. 4) The platform corporation has an incompatible but unified relationship between its social duty and financial success.

Publication types

  • Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't

MeSH terms

  • Decision Making
  • Government Agencies / organization & administration
  • Humans
  • Social Responsibility*

Grants and funding

The author(s) received no specific funding for this work.