Recently, debate over whether health care providers should have a protected right to conscientiously refuse to offer legal health care services-such as abortion, elective sterilization, aid in dying, or treatments for transgender patients-has grown exponentially. I advance a modified compromise view that bases respect for claims of conscientious refusal to provide specific health care services on a publicly defensible rationale. This view requires health care providers who refuse such services to disclose their availability by other providers, as well as to arrange for referrals or facilitate transfers of care. This requirement raises the question of whether providers are being forced to be complicit in the provision of services they deem to be morally objectionable. I conclude by showing how this modified compromise view answers the most significant objections mounted by critics of the right to conscientious refusal and safeguards providers from having to offer services that most directly threaten their moral integrity.
Keywords: Abortion; Aid in dying; Catholicism; Conscience; Conscientious objection; Conscientious refusal; Thomas Aquinas.