Financing Pull Mechanisms for Antibiotic-Related Innovation: Opportunities for Europe

Clin Infect Dis. 2020 Nov 5;71(8):1994-1999. doi: 10.1093/cid/ciaa153.

Abstract

Antibiotic innovation is in serious jeopardy as companies continue to abandon the market due to a lack of profitability. Novel antibiotics must be used sparingly to hinder the spread of resistance, but small companies cannot survive on revenues that do not cover operational costs. When these companies either go bankrupt or move onto other therapeutic areas, these antibiotics may be no longer accessible to patients. Although significant research efforts have detailed incentives to stimulate antibiotic innovation, little attention has been paid to the financing of these incentives. In this article, we take a closer look at 4 potential financing models (diagnosis-related group carve-out, stewardship taxes, transferable exclusivity voucher, and a European-based "pay or play" model) and evaluate them from a European perspective. The attractiveness of these models and the willingness for countries to test them are currently being vetted through the European Joint Action on AMR and Healthcare-Associated Infections (EU-JAMRAI).

Keywords: antibiotic resistance; antimicrobials; economic incentives; pull incentives.

Publication types

  • Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't

MeSH terms

  • Anti-Bacterial Agents* / pharmacology
  • Anti-Bacterial Agents* / therapeutic use
  • Drug Industry
  • Drug Resistance, Bacterial*
  • Europe
  • Humans
  • Motivation

Substances

  • Anti-Bacterial Agents